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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of FERNANDO NARANJO, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Respondent, 
Appearances: 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI ## 01-1 1-ST2934 Index No. 5010-1 1 
Fernando Naranjo 
Inmate No. 02-A-3 120 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Bare Hill Correctional Facility 
18 1 Brand Road 
Caller Box # 20 
Malone, NY 12953 
Eric T. Schneiderman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Cathy Y. Sheehan, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/J CI DGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Bare Hill Correctional Facility, commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated May 17,20 10 
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to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. In 1995 the petitioner was given a sentence 
of five years to life, upon conviction of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled 
substance 2”d degree. He was later paroled to deportation to his native country, Columbia. 
He subsequently reentered this country illegally. In 200 1 he committed the instant offense, 
robbery in the first degree. In 2002 he was convicted of that charge, and given a determinate 
sentence of eight years as a predicate felon.‘ 
Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner contends that the 
Parole Board failed to consider the appropriate factors under Executive Law 5 2594; that 
because he was granted a certificate of earned eligibility, he is entitled to a presumption in 
favor of early release; that the Parole Board failed to give meaningful consideration to his 
sentencing minutes; that he has already served time in excess of the appropriate guideline 
range; that he has an excellent institutional record, including programming; that the Parole 
Board failed to provide guidance or recommendations to enable him to obtain release in the 
future; that the determination was the result of an unofficial executive policy to deny parole 
to violent felony offenders; and that there is no rational basis to hold him for an addition 
twenty four months. 
The determination of the Parole Board recites as follows: 
“Denied 24 months, March 20 12. Notwithstanding the EEC, 
after a review of the record and interview, the panel has 
determined that if released at this time, there is a reasonable 
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without 
again violating the law and your release would be incompatible 
Because a period of post-release supervision was not imposed at that time, the petitioner 
was brought hnck fnr re-xnt.=ncin:; on Maj 21,2010. The smiwcing court adhered to the eight 




with the welfare of society. This decision is based on the 
following factors: your instant offense is robbery in the first 
degree in which you produced a knife, acted in concert, 
thrcatened, beat and kicked the victim and when you found him 
later he was assaulted and threatened again. Your record dates 
back to a 1995 felony drug case. Note is made of your 
programming, disciplinary record, sentencing minutes and all 
other required factors. Despite being on life parole and here 
illegally after deportation you continue to engage in serious 
felonious conduct. Parole is denied.” 
As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interactions with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as 
a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans 
including community resources, employment, education and 
training and support services available to the inmate; (iv) any 
deportation order issued by the federal government against the 
inmate while in the custody of the department and any 
recommendation regarding deportation made by the 
commissioner of the department pursuant to section one hundred 
forty-seven of the correction law; (v) any statement made to the 
board by the crime victim or the victim’s representative, where 
the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically 
incapacitated; (vi) the length of the determinate sentence to 
which the inmate would be subject had he or she received a 
sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.71 of the penal 
law for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or article 
two hundred twenty-one of the penal law; (vii) the seriousness 
o f  the nffenw with diw cotwideration to thc typc of ~~‘iitc‘iicc, 
length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court. 
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the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence 
probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and 
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to 
confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the 
nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous 
probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.” 
(Executive Law 92594 [2] [c] [A]). 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3d Dept., 
200 11). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which 
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. 
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner’s possession of an earned eligibility certificate, his institutional 
programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. The decision was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it 
satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-i (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 
[2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 20 1 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. 
New York State Evisinn nfParnk ,  199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is p o p  d i d ,  iii 
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fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate‘s crimes and their 
violent nature (see Matter of Matos v New York State Board of Parole, 87 AD3d 1 193 [3d 
Dept., 201 13; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the 
inmate’s criminal history (E Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; 
Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not 
required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining 
the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Matos v New York 
State Board of Parole, supra; Matter of Young; v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 
1681, 1681-1682 [3rd Dept., 20101; Matter of Wise vNew York State Division ofparole, 54 
AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 20081). Nor must the Parole Board recite the precise statutory language 
set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law 6 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v 
--9 Dennkon 28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board 
may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the 
crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, 
together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible 
with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] 
crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division 
of Parole_, 3 AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law 52594 [2] [c] [A], other 
citations omitted). 
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a 
guarantee ofrclcxc (2lnttcr. i , j f & ! ! . ~ w ~  vYew Y m k  3tatc Boai-d af J3i7Ulc, 30 L-lD3d 830 [S‘ 
5 
[* 5]
Dept., 20061; Matter of Pearl v New York State Divisiori of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). 
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined 
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent 
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument (see Matter of 
Lue-Shing v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827,828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New 
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, 
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061; Matter of Motti v Dennison, 
38 AD3d 1030, 103 1 [3rd Dep., 20071; Matter of Garofolo v Dennison, 53 AD3d 734 [3rd 
Dept., 20081; Matter of MacKenzie v Dennison, 55 AD3d 1092, 1193 [3rd Dept., 20081). 
Petitioner's argument that the Parole Board is required to advise petitioner andor 
provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabilitative efforts he 
should engage in to increase his chance for release at a future parole interview has no merit 
L see Executive Law 0 2594 [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR $ 8002.3; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 661 
[2"d Cir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 21 AD3d 1 174 [3rd 
Dept., 20051). 
With respect to petitioner's argument that he has served time in excess of the parole 
guideline range (see 9 NYCRR 800 1.3), the guidelines "are intended only as a guide, and are 
not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each individual 
case" (see, 9 NYCRR 800 1.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole, 
290 AD2d 907, 908 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Rodriguez v Evans, 82 AD3d 1397 [36 
6 
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Dept., 201 11). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a basis to overturn the 
Board's decision. 
Petitioner's claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a 
resentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses's prohibition against multiple 
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York Stak 
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive 
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v 
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., West. Co., 20061; Matter of Kelwasinski v Paterson, 
80 AD3d 1065, 1066 [3d Dept., 201 13; Matter of Carter v Evans, 81 AD3d 1031,1031 [3d 
Dept., 201 11). The fact that an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not 
confer upon the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v 
Alexander, 54 AD3d 11 14, 11 15 [3rd Dept., 20081). The Parole Board is vested with the 
discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the 
sentencing court set the minimum term of petitioner's sentence (e Matter of Silmon v 
Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of Gomez v New York State Division of Parole, 
87 AD3d 1197 [3d Dept., 201 13; Matter of Cody v Dennisw, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd 
Dept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd 
Ckpt., 20071). 
Although the petitioner maintains that the Parole Board failed to consider the 
sentencing minutes, said minutes were a part of the record under review, and were 
specifically mentioned during the parole interview. As such, the argument has no merit. 
7 
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determinant sentence for robbery in the first degree, that the Parole Board exceeded its 
authority in holding him for twenty four months, In the Court's view, this argument ignores 
the fact that the petitioner was still serving the 1995 sentence for which he received five 
years to life, and that parole would have been automatically revoked with regard to that 
sentence upon his 2002 conviction of robbery first degree (see Executive Law 9 2594 [3] [d] 
[iii]; Tineo v New York State Division of Parole, 14 AD2d 949 [3d Dept., 20051; Matter of 
Meade v Boil&, 67 AD3d 1263 [3d Dept., 20091; Adams v New York State Division of 
Parole, 278 AD2d 62 1 [3d Dept., 20001). The Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for 
the maximum period (24 months) was within the Board's discretion and was supported by the 
record (see Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd 
Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
Thi.: shall constitute thc dscisiuu, Ui-dd~;i. a c l  juJgiiiGiil of dir: CUULC. The urigirial 
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tlecision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: November /6 ,201 I 
Troy, New York George B. Ceresia, Jr. 




Order To Show Cause dated August 1 1,20 1 1, Petition, Supporting Papers 
and Exhibits 




STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of FERNANDO NARANJO, 
Petitioner, 
-against - 
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-1 1-ST2934 Index No. 5010-1 1 
SEALING ORDER 
The following documents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in 
camera review in connection with the above matter, namely, respondent’s Exhibit B, 
Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent’s Exhibit D, Confidential Portion of Inmate 
Status Report, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the foregoing designated documents, including all duplicates and 
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person or 
public or private agency unless by further order of the Court. 
Dated: 
ENTER 
November 16 ,201 1 
Troy, New York 
Supreme Court Justice 
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